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Abstract: Provide application processes with strong agreement guarantees despite failures is a fundamental problem of fault-tolerant
distributed computing. Correct processes have not to be “polluted” by the erroneous behavior of faulty processes. This paper considers
the consensus agreement problem in a setting where some processes can behave arbitrarily (Byzantine behavior). In such a context it
is possible that Byzantine processes collude to direct the correct processes to decide on a “bad” value (a value proposed only by faulty
processes).
The paper has several contributions. It presents a family of consensus algorithms in which no bad value is ever decided by correct
processes. These processes always decide a value they have proposed (and this is always the case when they all propose the same
value) or a default value ⊥. These algorithms are called intrusion-free consensus algorithms. To that end, each consensus algorithm is
based on an appropriate underlying broadcast algorithm. One of these abstractions, called validated broadcast is new and allows the
design of a resilience-optimal consensus algorithm (i.e., it copes with up to t < n/3 faulty processes where n is the total number of
processes). All proposed consensus algorithms assume the underlying system is enriched with additional computational power provided
by a binary Byzantine consensus algorithm. The paper presents also a resilience-optimal randomized binary consensus algorithm based
on the validated broadcast abstraction. An important feature of all these algorithms lies in the fact that they are signature-free (and hence
particularly efficient).
Key-words: Asynchronous message-passing system, Broadcast abstraction, Byzantine process, Consensus problem, Fault-tolerance,
Intrusion-tolerance, Reliable broadcast, Resilience, Signature-free algorithm, Time-free algorithm.
Tolerance aux intrusions sans authentification
Résumé : Ce rapport propose une famille de protocoles de décision qui assurent que la valeur de décision n’est jamais une valeur
proposée par des processus malicieux. Ces protocoles sont fondés sur différentes opérations de diffusion mais sans utiliser la cryptogra-
phie.
Mots clés : Système à communication par messages, opération de diffusion, processus byzantin, problème de consensus, tolèrance aux
fautes, intrusions, diffusion fiable, protocole sans signatures.
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1 Introduction
Asynchronous Byzantine consensus A process has a Byzantine behavior when it behaves arbitrarily. This bad behavior can be
intentional (malicious behavior, e.g., due to intrusion) or simply the result of a transient fault that altered the local state of a process,
thereby modifying its behavior in an unpredictable way. We are interested here is solving the consensus problem in asynchronous
distributed systems prone to Byzantine process failures whatever their origin.
In a classical crash failure setting, the consensus problem is defined as follows: every process proposes a value and the non-faulty
processes have to decide (termination property) on the same value (agreement property), that has to be one of the proposed values
(validity). In a Byzantine failure setting, the notion of “value proposed by a faulty process” is not well-defined. Hence, the validity
property is weakened and usually replaced by the following: if all non-faulty processes propose the same value, that value is decided.
Aim of the paper Unfortunately, the previous validity property leaves open the possibility for the non-faulty processes to decide an
arbitrary value when all of them do not propose the same value, and such a “bad” value can “pollute” their behavior. Hence, the idea
to introduce an additional validity property, that we call non-intrusion, to prevent this type of behavior, namely, a value proposed only
by faulty processes cannot be decided by non-faulty processes. Said in another way, the non-faulty processes are required to decide the
value proposed by one of them (and this has to be always the case when they all propose the same value), or a default value (denoted ⊥)
when they are not enough to propose the very same value.
The paper presents a family of asynchronous Byzantine multivalued consensus algorithms that satisfy the previous property. We call
them intrusion-free consensus algorithms. Of course, as consensus cannot be solved in asynchronous system in which even only one
process may crash [11], the underlying system has to be enriched with additional computational power in order consensus can be solved
despite the net effect of asynchrony and Byzantine failures. We consider here that this additional power is given by an underlying binary
Byzantine consensus algorithm (e.g., [18, 25]).
Content of the paper All the multivalued Byzantine consensus algorithms presented in the paper are signature-free (no underlying
cryptography mechanism is assumed). Each algorithm relies on an appropriate underlying broadcast operation (that can be implemented
despite asynchrony and up to t Byzantine processes, where t is constrained by a function on the total number n of processes). These
broadcast abstractions are the classical unreliable broadcast (that requires t < n), the “echo” broadcast introduced in [3] (that we call
no-duplicity broadcast), the reliable broadcast introduced in [4], plus a novel all-to-all broadcast abstraction that can be interesting by
itself, that we call validated broadcast. All these broadcast abstractions (but unreliable broadcast) require n > 3t to be implemented in
an asynchronous system prone to Byzantine failures. They differ in the number of consecutive communication steps they need.
As we will see, the new validated broadcast abstraction is particularly interesting in the context of Byzantine processes. This is
because it allows a correct process to deliver a message only if that message has been validated by at least one correct process. Said
differently, validated broadcast eliminates the “noise” introduced by “bad” values (i.e., values proposed only by Byzantine processes).
A resulting multivalued Byzantine consensus algorithm is then characterized by its underlying broadcast algorithm that has a par-
ticular cost counted by the number of communication steps, the size of control additional information messages have to carry, and their
messages. As we will see, the proposed algorithms are highly modular and exhibit a tradeoff relating their time efficiency (the weaker
the underlying broadcast abstraction, the more efficient the algorithm), and the constraint on t they need (the weaker the underlying
broadcast abstraction, the stronger the constraint on t).
The paper also presents a binary Byzantine consensus algorithm (which can provide the previous algorithms with the required
additional computing power). This algorithm is signature-free, requires t < n/3 (and is consequently optimal with respect to resilience),
and needs six communication steps per round.
Related work Numerous Asynchronous Byzantine algorithms have been proposed (e.g., [3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 15, 16, 22, 24] to cite a few;
see also [19] for a short survey). To our knowledge, the only algorithm that considers the non-intrusion property is the one described in
[9] (this algorithm requires messages to carry a vector of proposed values which, as shown here, is not necessary).
The idea to direct the processes to decide⊥ in “bad scenarios” (i.e., when they cannot decide a value they have proposed) is different
but in the same spirit as the idea developed in the notion of abortable objects [1]. In that case, the “bad scenarios” are when there is
concurrency among operations. In a concurrency context, operations can return ⊥, while an operation has always to return a non-trivial
result when executed in a concurrency-free context.
Road map The paper is made up of 9 sections. Section 2 presents the computation model, the different broadcast abstractions, and
an algorithm implementing the validated broadcast abstraction. Section 3 presents the intrusion-free Byzantine consensus problem.
Then, Sections 4 and 5 present a suite of intrusion-free multivalued Byzantine consensus algorithms that differ mainly in the underlying
broadcast abstraction they use. Section 6 discusses the previous algorithms. Section 7 presents a randomized binary consensus algorithm
based on the validated broadcast abstraction. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
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2 Computation system model
2.1 Base model
Asynchronous processes The system is made up of a finite set of n > 1 processes denoted p1, . . . , pn that communicate by exchang-
ing messages through a communication network. Each process proceeds to its own speed, which means that processes are asynchronous.
Multiset All algorithms presented in the paper use multisets. A multiset (sometimes also called bag) differs from a set in that it can
contain several copies of the same value. Given a multiset reci, #v(reci) denotes the occurrence number of v in reci.
Failure model Up to t processes can exhibit a Byzantine behavior. A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it
can crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transition, etc.
Moreover, Byzantine processes can collude to “pollute” the computation. Yet, it is assumed that they do not control the network. This
means that they cannot corrupt the messages sent by non-Byzantine processes, and the schedule of message delivery is uncorrelated
to Byzantine behavior. A process that exhibits a Byzantine behavior is called faulty. Otherwise, it is correct or non-faulty. Given an
execution, C denotes the set of processes that are correct in that execution.
Notation This process model is denoted BZ_ASn,t[∅]. In the following, this model is enriched with a constraint on t and a specific
broadcast abstraction. As an example, BZ_ASn,t[n > 5t,WB] is BZ_ASn,t[∅] in which less than n/5 processes are faulty and
processes communicate using the operations of theWB broadcast abstraction (see below).
2.2 Asynchronous communication network
Base communication network Each pair of processes is connected by a channel (which means that when a process receives a message,
it knows which is the sender of the message). Each channel is asynchronous (no bound on message transfer delay, except it is finite),
and reliable (no loss, creation or corruption of messages). Hence, the network is asynchronous.
A process pi sends a message to a process pj by invoking the primitive “send TAG(m) to pj”, where TAG is the type of the message
and m its content. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a process can send messages to itself. A process receives a message
by executing the primitive “receive()”.
In the following, several types of broadcast operations are defined. They all can be implemented from the base send and receive
primitives, which means that, while they provide us with distinct communication abstraction levels, they do not provide the processes
with additional computing power.
When considering the broadcast abstraction XX (where XX stands for WB, NDB, VB or RB, see below), we say that a process
“XX-broadcasts” or “XX-delivers” a message.
Unreliable broadcast The first pair of operations denotedWB_broadcast() andWB_deliver() are used to denote a simple unreliable
broadcast. WB_broadcast TAG(m) is used as a shortcut for
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} send TAG(m) to pj end for,
and WB_deliver() is synonym with receive(). This means that a message broadcast by a correct process is delivered to all processes.
Differently, while it is assumed to send the same message to all processes, a faulty process can actually send different messages to
distinct processes and no message to others.
Trivially, an invocation of WB_broadcast TAG(m) costs one communication step and O(n) messages (more precisely, n − 1 mes-
sages). This communication abstraction is calledWB, and the corresponding system model is denoted BZ_ASn,t[WB].
Remark When measuring the cost of a broadcast abstraction we do not take into account the size of the “data message” that is
broadcast. This is because this size is independent of the way the broadcast is implemented. We only consider the size of the additional
control information required by the corresponding broadcast implementation.
No-duplicity broadcast This communication abstraction, denotedNDB, is defined by the operationsNDB_broadcast() andNDB_deliver()
that provide the processes with a higher abstraction level thanWB. Considering an instance where NDB_broadcast() is invoked by pro-
cess pi, this broadcast abstraction is defined by the following properties.
• NDB-No-duplicity. No two correct processes NDB-deliver distinct messages from pi.
• NDB-Termination. If the sender is correct, all correct processes eventually NDB-deliver its message.
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The corresponding system model is denoted BZ_ASn,t[NDB]. Let us observe that, if the sender pi is faulty, it is possible that
some correct processes deliver a message from pi while others do not. The no duplicity property prevents correct processes from
delivering different messages from a faulty sender. (When considering the less severe crash failure model, no-duplicity broadcast and
weak broadcast are equivalent.)
This broadcast primitive has been defined by Toueg [24]. It can be built on top of the base send/receive primitives in systems
where t < n/3. Such an implementation uses two consecutive communication steps and O(n2) underlying messages (n− 1 in the first
communication step, and n(n−1) in the second one). The size of the control information added to a message is log2 n (sender identity).
Reliable broadcast The reliable broadcast abstraction, denoted RB, has been proposed by Bracha [4]. Strictly stronger than the
no-duplicity broadcast, it provides processes with the operations RB_broadcast() and RB_deliver() defined by the following properties.
• RB-No-duplicity. No two correct processes RB-deliver distinct messages from pi.
• RB-Termination. If the sender is correct, all correct processes eventually RB-deliver its message.
• RB-Uniformity. If a correct process RB-delivers a message from pi (possibly faulty) then all correct processes eventually RB-
deliver a message from pi.
It has been proved in [4] that n > 3t is a necessary requirement to implement this operation. If the sender is correct, only three
communication steps and O(n2) messages whose size is O(log2 n) bits are necessary.
Validated broadcast This last communication abstraction, denotedVB, is defined by the operationsVB_broadcast() andVB_deliver()
described below. It is a new abstraction that provides the processes with a communication level higher than no-duplicity broadcast. More
precisely, validated broadcast is an all-to-all reliable broadcast with a notion of message validation, namely, a message has to be vali-
dated by enough processes in order to be VB-delivered, otherwise the default value ⊥ is VB-delivered instead of it.
As it is an all-to-all broadcast, VB requires that all correct processes invoke VB_broadcast(). The idea is that a value v is valid if
there is at least one correct process that broadcasts that value. As no process knows if it is itself correct or faulty (e.g., a process can
correctly execute its algorithm and then crash), a value broadcast by a process is required to be validated by n − 2t ≥ t + 1 processes
to be valid. As already indicated, if a message value is not validated, ⊥ is delivered instead of it.
More precisely, assuming a broadcast instance in which every correct process invokes VB_broadcast(), let us consider the invocation
of a particular process pi that invokes VB_broadcast(m). VB is defined by the following properties.
• VB-No-duplicity. No two correct processes VB-deliver distinct messages from pi (the message that is VB-delivered can be a
non-⊥ value or the default value ⊥).
• VB-Termination. If the sender is correct and VB-broadcast m, all correct processes eventually VB-deliver the same message m′
wherem′ ism or ⊥.
• VB-Uniformity. If a correct process VB-delivers a message from pi (possibly faulty), all correct processes eventually VB-deliver
a message from pi.
• VB-Validation. If ⊥ is VB-delivered, there is at least one correct process that does not validate the message VB-broadcast by pi.
Ifm′ 6= ⊥ is VB-delivered,m′ has been validated by at least one correct process.
broadcast x-to-y # comm. steps message size # msgs constraint on t
WB 1-to-n 1 constant n− 1 n > t
NDB 1-to-n 2 log2 n 0(n
2) n > 3t
RB 1-to-n 3 log2 n 0(n
2) n > 3t
VB n-to-n 6 log2 n n× 0(n2) n > 3t
Table 1: Cost and constraint of the different broadcast abstractions
Comparing the broadcast abstractions Table 1 compares the costs of the three previous broadcast abstractions. Considering one
broadcast instance, the second column indicates the broadcast type (1-to-n or n-to-n). The third column indicates the number of (sequen-
tial) communication steps that are needed. The fourth column presents the size of additional control information that an implementation
message has to carry (the log2 n comes from the fact that the identity of the process that broadcasts a message has to be sent together
with it when forwarded by another process). The fifth column indicates the number of implementation messages that are needed. Finally,
the last column states the constraint on t required to implement the corresponding abstraction in BZ_ASn,t[∅].
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2.3 An implementation of the validated broadcast abstraction
Algorithm 1 implements the all-to-all validated broadcast. Let us recall that all-to-all means here that all correct processes are assumed
to invoke VB_broadcast(). This means that a process VB-delivers at least n − t messages. This implementation uses two consecutive
RB-broadcast invocations. Its cost is consequently, 2× 3 = 6 communication steps and O(n3) messages of size O(log2 n) bits.
The implementation of a VB-broadcast instance is made up of two parts.
• The first part is made up of two consecutive RB-broadcasts. More precisely, a process pi first invokes RB_broadcast INIT(vi) and
waits until it has RB-delivered messages from at least n − t processes (lines 01-03). The values RB-delivered are deposited in a
multiset denoted reci.
Then, if value vi has been RB-delivered from at least n− 2t ≥ t+ 1 processes (which means that it has been RB-broadcast by at
least one correct process), pi validates it by assigning yes to auxi. Otherwise pi sets auxi to no at line 04 (in that case it does not
validate vi). Then, pi issues a second RB-broadcast (line 05) to disseminate auxi (that is equal to yes or no) to all processes.
operation VB_broadcast(vi)
(01) RB_broadcast INIT(v);
(02) let reci = multiset of values RB_delivered to pi;
(03) wait until (|reci| ≥ n− t);
(04) if (#vi (reci) ≥ n− 2t) then auxi ← yes else auxi ← no end if;
(05) RB_broadcast VALID(auxi).
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n VB-delivery task Ti[j]:
(06) wait until
`
VALID(x) and INIT(v) are RB_delivered from pj
´
;
(07) if (x = yes) then wait until (#v(reci) ≥ n− 2t); d = v;
(08) else wait until (#v′ 6=v(reci) ≥ t+ 1); d = ⊥;
(09) end if;
(10) VB_deliver(d) at pi as the value VB-broadcast by pj .
Algorithm 1: A reliable-broadcast-based implementation of VB-broadcast
• The second part is made up of n tasks. The task Ti[j] starts by the wait statement for both the value v RB-broadcast by pj and
the boolean x RB-broadcast by pj to say whether its value v has been validated or not. Note that the value v can be delivered
either at line 03 or at line 06. (Let us remind that each time a message INIT(v) is RB-delivered to pi, the value v is added to reci,
which means that, after the predicate |reci| ≥ n − t has become true at line 03, the set reci still keeps on being updated when
new messages INIT() are RB-delivered to pi.)
If x = yes, as pj can be Byzantine, v has not necessarily been validated. Hence, pi has to check it. To that end, pi waits until the
predicate #v(reci) ≥ n − 2t becomes true (line 07). When this predicate #v(reci) ≥ n − 2t ≥ t + 1 becomes true (if ever it
does, line 07) we have #v(reci) ≥ t+ 1 and, consequently, v is VB-delivered to pi as being the value VB-broadcast by pj .
Differently, if x = no, pi waits until reci contains more than t values different from v (the value RB-delivered from pj). When
this occurs (if ever it does, line 07) pi VB-delivers ⊥ as the value VB-broadcast by pj .
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 implements the validated broadcast abstraction in BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,RB].
Proof Proof of the VB-no-duplicity property (no two correct processes VB-deliver distinct messages from a given process pi). This
property is a direct consequence of the RB-no-duplicity property of the underlying RB-broadcast abstraction used to send a message
VALID() at line 05 (which states that no two correct processes RB-deliver different values from the same process).
Proof of the VB-termination property (if pi is correct and VB-broadcast m, all correct processes eventually VB-deliver the same
messagem′ from pi wherem′ ism or ⊥). As there are at least n− t correct processes, and each correct process VB-broadcasts a value,
we eventually have |recj | ≥ n − t at any correct process pj . Hence, no correct process blocks forever at line 03 and RB-broadcasts a
message VALID() at line 05. We now consider two cases.
• Let pi be a correct process that RB-broadcast VALID(yes). It follows from line 07 that (a) d = vi (the value VB-broadcast by
pi), and (b) reci contains at least n − 2t copies of v = vi, i.e., pi has RB-delivered n − 2t messages INIT (v). Due to the
RB-uniformity of RB-broadcast, any correct process pj eventually RB-delivers these n− 2t messages INIT (v) and VALID(yes),
from which follows that pj VB-delivers v = vi at line 10.
• Let pi be a correct process that RB-broadcasts VALID(no). It follows from the RB-termination property that any correct process
pj RB-delivers no from pi. Moreover, from the test line 04, if pi RB-broadcast VALID(no) then among the n−t values in reci less
then n− 2t values are equal to vi i.e. more than t values are different from vi. Hence due to the RB-uniformity of RB-broadcast,
any correct process pj eventually RB-delivers at least t+ 1 values different from vi and consequently VB-delivers ⊥ at line 10.
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Proof of the VB-uniformity property (if a correct process pi VB-delivers a message from pj -possibly faulty-, all correct processes
eventually VB-deliver a message from pj). Let pi be a correct process that VB-delivers a value d from pj . This means that pi has
previously RB-delivered a message INIT(v) and a message VALID(x) from pj at the latest in its delivery task Ti[j]. The proof of this
property is very similar to the previous one.
It follows from the predicate at line 06 that pi has RB-delivered (1) two messages VALID(x) and INIT(v) from pj and (2) a set reci of
values that satisfies some property (depending on the value of x). Due to the RB-uniformity property, any correct process pj eventually
RB-delivers the messages VALID(x) and INIT(v) RB-delivered by pi and also a set recj = reci of values. It follows that pj eventually
RB-delivers the same value as pi. from pj .
Proof of the VB-validation property (if⊥ is VB-delivered from pi there is at least one correct process that does not validate the message
VB-broadcast by pi. If v 6= ⊥ is VB-delivered, v has been validated by at least one correct process).
If a value v 6= ⊥ is VB-delivered by a correct process pi as the value VB-broadcast by pj , this value appears at least n− 2t ≥ t+ 1
times in reci which means that at least one correct process has VB-broadcast v. Similarly, if ⊥ is VB-delivered, at least t+ 1 processes
have VB-broadcast values that differ from the value VB-broadcast by pj . 2Theorem 1
3 Intrusion-tolerant Byzantine consensus and the enriched model
3.1 Byzantine consensus
Byzantine consensus The consensus problem has been informally stated in the Introduction. Assuming that at least each correct
process proposes a value, each of them has to decide on a value in such a way that the following properties are satisfied.
• C-Termination. Every correct process eventually decides on a value.
• C-Agreement. No two correct processes decide on different values.
• C-Obligation (validity). If all correct processes propose the same value v, then v is decided.
Intrusion-tolerant Byzantine (ITB) consensus In Byzantine consensus, if not all correct processes propose the same value, any
value can be decided. As indicated in the Introduction, we are interested in a stronger version of the consensus problem in which a value
proposed only by faulty processes can never be decided. This consensus problem instance is defined by the termination, agreement and
obligation properties stated above plus the following validity property.
• C-Non-intrusion (validity). A decided value is a value proposed by a correct process or ⊥.
The fact that no value proposed only by faulty processes can be decided gives its name (namely intrusion-tolerant) to that consensus
problem instance.
Binary consensus The consensus is binary when only two values (e.g., 0 and 1) can be proposed. When more than two values can be
proposed, consensus is multivalued.
Interestingly, the fact that only two values can be proposed to a binary Byzantine consensus algorithm provides it with an interesting
property, namely, if all correct processes propose the same value b ∈ {0, 1}, it follows from the obligation property that they decide b,
whatever the value (b or b = 1− b) proposed by the faulty processes. Hence, we have the following property (that is no longer true for
multivalued consensus).
Property 1. Any binary Byzantine consensus algorithm that satisfies the obligation property, satisfies also the non-intrusion property.
Moreover, ⊥ is never decided.
3.2 Enriched model for multivalued ITB consensus
Additional power is required It is well-known that Byzantine consensus cannot be solved when t ≤ n/3 in synchronous systems
[14, 20]. Moreover, consensus cannot be solved in asynchronous systems as soon as even only one process may crash [11], which means
that Byzantine consensus cannot be solved either as soon as one process can be faulty. Said another way, additional computational power
is needed if one wants to solve Byzantine consensus in an asynchronous system.
Such an additional power can be obtained by randomization (e.g., [3, 9, 13, 21, 24]), failure detectors (e.g., [13, 15]), additional
synchrony assumptions (e.g., [10, 16]), or even the assumption that there is a binary consensus algorithm that is given for free by the
underlying system (e.g., [6, 9, 18, 22, 25]).
Collection des Publications Internes de l’Irisa c©IRISA
Signature-Free Broadcast-Based Intrusion Tolerance 7
Enriched model for multivalued ITB consensus In the following, BBC denotes any algorithm that solves the binary Byzantine
consensus problem. (Such algorithms are described in [4, 9, 13, 24]. See also Section 7). Let BZ_ASn,t[XX,BBC ] denote the system
model BZ_ASn,t[∅] enriched with BBC (computational power) and the broadcast abstraction XX.
As announced in the Introduction, the aim is to design a generic multivalued ITB consensus algorithm on top ofBZ_ASn,t[XX,BBC ].
4 A generic consensus algorithm based on theWB or NDB abstraction
This section presents a generic multivalued ITB consensus algorithm that can be instantiated with WB or NDB. It uses two rounds for
each process to compute a value it proposes to the underlying binary consensus. The instantiation with WB requires n > 5t, while the
one with NDB requires n > 4t.
Principles and description of the algorithm In Algorithm 2, a process invokes propose(vi) where vi is the value it proposes to the
consensus. It terminates when it executes the return() statement (line 14) that supplies it with the decided value. (In order to prevent
confusion, the operation of the underlying binary consensus that is built is denoted bin_propose().)
In order to reduce the Byzantine consensus problem to its binary counterpart to benefit from BBC , the processes first exchange the
values they propose. If a process sees that a value v has been proposed “enough” times, it proposes 1 to BBC , otherwise it proposes 0.
Then, if 1 is decided from BBC , the correct processes decide the value v that has been proposed “enough” times, otherwise they decide
⊥ (lines 09-14). For this to work, two things are necessary:
• (a) A value has to appear as if it has been proposed by enough processes.
• (b) If a process pi proposes 1 to BBC because it has seen enough copies of a value v, it must be sure that any other correct process
pj will be able to decide v even if it has proposed 0 to BBC (because it has not seen enough copies of v).
operation propose(vi)
(01) XX_broadcast EST1(vi);
(02) wait until
`
EST1(−) messages XX_delivered from (n− t) processes´;
(03) let rec1i = multiset of values XX_delivered and carried by EST1 messages;
(04) if (∃v : #v(rec1i) ≥ n− 2t) then auxi ← v else auxi ← ⊥ end if;
(05) XX_broadcast EST2(auxi);
(06) wait until
`
EST2(−) messages XX_delivered from (n− t) processes´;
(07) let rec2i = multiset of values XX_delivered and carried by EST2 messages;
(08) if (∃v 6= ⊥ : #v(rec2i) ≥ n− 2t) then bpi ← 1 else bpi ← 0 end if;
(09) if (∃v 6= ⊥ : v ∈ rec2i) then let v = most frequent non-⊥ value in rec2i;
(10) resi ← v
(11) else resi ← ⊥
(12) end if;
(13) b_deci ← bin_propose(bpi); % underlying binary consensus %
(14) if (b_deci = 1) then return(resi) else return(⊥) end if.
Algorithm 2: A generic intrusion-tolerant Byzantine consensus algorithm
These two issues are solved by two asynchronous rounds executed before invoking the underlying BBC algorithm (lines 01-12).
The messages of the first round and the second round are tagged EST1 and EST2, respectively. Interestingly, we will state below two
properties PR1 and PR2 that are the same as the properties used in [17] to solve consensus on top of an asynchronous system enriched
with any of Chandra and Toueg’s failure detectors [8].
It is important to remark that, at the abstraction level of the consensus algorithm, a message carries only a tag (EST1 or EST2) and
a proposed value or ⊥. Hence, considering that proposed values have constant size, the size of the messages used by the algorithm is
O(1) (no message is required to carry array-like data structures whose size would depend on n).
First round The aim of this round (lines 01-04) is to direct each process pi to define a “new” proposed value auxi in such a way that
the values auxi of the correct processes satisfy the following property (Lemma 1):
PR1 ≡ [∀i, j ∈ C : ((auxi 6= ⊥) ∧ (auxj 6= ⊥)) ⇒
(auxi = auxj = v) ∧ (v has been proposed by a correct process)
]
.
Hence this round replaces (for the correct processes) the set of values they propose by a non-empty set including at most two values
(namely, a value v proposed by a correct process and ⊥).
From an operational point of view, this is obtained as follows. The processes first exchange (with the help of the underlying broadcast
facility) the values they propose (lines 01-02). The values delivered at pi are kept in the multiset rec1i. Then, if there is a value v in
rec1i such that #v(rec1i) ≥ n− 2t, v is assigned to auxi. Otherwise auxi = ⊥.
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Second round The aim of the second round (lines 05-12) is to establish the following property denoted PR2 (Lemma 2) in order the
result of the underlying BBC algorithm can be safely exploited as described previously (lines 13-14). The local variable bpi contains
the value proposed by pi to the underlying BBC algorithm, and resj contains the non-⊥ value that any correct process pj will decide if
⊥ is not decided.
PR2 ≡ [(∃i ∈ C : bpi = 1)⇒ (∀j ∈ C : resj = resi = v 6= ⊥)].
Operationally, this is obtained as follows. With the help of the underlying broadcast abstraction the correct processes exchange the
values of their auxi variables. The values delivered at pi are saved in the multiset rec2i. (This multiset contains n− t values, and, due
to PR1, those can be ⊥, a non-⊥ value v proposed by a correct process, and at most t arbitrary values sent by faulty processes.)
If there is a non-⊥ value v such that #v(rec2i) ≥ n− 2t, pi proposes bpi = 1 to the binary consensus. Otherwise, pi has not seen
enough copies of a value v 6= ⊥ and consequently proposes bpi = 0. In all cases, pi defines resi as the most frequent non-⊥ value it has
received. As the proof of Lemma 2 will show, if a correct process pi invokes bin_propose(1), all correct processes will have the same
non-⊥ value in their resj variables.
4.1 Proof of the algorithm
Let us recall that C denotes the set of processes that are correct in the considered execution.
Lemma 1. PR1 holds in both system models BZ_ASn,t[t < n/5,WB] and BZ_ASn,t[t < n/4,NDB].
Proof Let pi and pj be two correct processes such that auxi = v 6= ⊥. We consider separately each case stated in the lemma
assumption.
• Case 1: t < n/5 and the correct processes use the broadcast abstractionWB.
As auxi = v 6= ⊥, it follows that #v(rec1i) ≥ n − 2t (line 04). Hence, due to the WB abstraction, among the n − t messages
it has WB-delivered (from different processes), at least n − 2t are EST1(v). As at most t processes are faulty, it follows that at
least n − 3t correct processes have broadcast a message EST1(v). It then follows from n > 5t that, among the n − t messages
it has WB-delivered (from different processes), pj has WB-delivered at least n − 4t messages EST1(v) from correct processes,
i.e., pj has WB-delivered at least t+ 1 messages EST1(v). On another side, as pj assigns w to auxj , it has WB-delivered n− 2t
messages EST1(w) (from different processes).
Hence, among the n− tmessages that pj has WB-delivered, (i): n−2t are from different processes and carry w, and (ii): at least
t+ 1 are from different correct processes and carry v. As (n− 2t) + (t+ 1) > n− t, it follows that there is a correct process px
that WB-broadcast EST1(w) and EST1(v), but as it is correct it WB-broadcast a single message and we consequently have v = w.
Finally, the proof that v has been proposed by a correct process follows from the observation that v has been sent by at least
n− 3t > t correct processes.
• Case 2: t < n/4 and the correct processes use the broadcast abstraction NDB.
In that case, pi has NDB-delivered at least n− 2t messages EST1(v), from different processes, and pj has NDB-delivered at least
n−2tmessages EST1(w) from different processes. As n > 4t, it follows that there is a process px such that pi has NDB-delivered
EST1(v) from px and pj has NDB-delivered EST1(w) from px. If px is correct, this is impossible (NDB-termination property). If
px is faulty, this is also impossible due to the NDB-no-duplicity property (if a correct process NDB-delivers a value from a faulty
process px, any other correct process either NDB-delivers the same value from px or does not NDB-deliver a message from px).
It follows that we have v = w.
Finally, similarly to the previous case, the proof that v has been proposed by a correct process follows from the observation that v
has been NDB-broadcast by at least n− 2t > t correct processes.
2Lemma 1
Lemma 2. PR2 holds in both system models BZ_ASn,t[t < n/5,WB] and BZ_ASn,t[t < n/4,NDB].
Proof Let pi be a process such that bpi = 1. It follows from lines 06-08 that the multiset rec2i contains n − t values (including ⊥).
From line 08 we also have (bpi = 1)⇒
(∃v 6= ⊥ : #v(rec2i) ≥ n− 2t), from which we conclude that pi has delivered at least n− 2t
messages EST2(v). Moreover, due to Lemma 1, the values sent by correct processes are only v or ⊥. Let us consider separately each
case stated in the lemma assumption.
• Case 1: t < n/5 and the correct processes use the broadcast abstractionWB.
As there are at most t faulty processes, at most t messages EST2(v)WB-delivered by pi are from faulty processes. Consequently,
at least n−3t correct processes have WB-broadcast EST2(v) to pj . As pj waits for n− tmessages, it can miss at most tmessages
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EST2(v) from correct processes (this is because, in the worst case, the t messages missed by pj are from correct processes that
WB-broadcast EST2(v)). Consequently, pj WB-delivers at least n − 4t messages EST2(v) from correct processes. As n > 5t,
we have#v(rec2j) ≥ n− 4t > t. Let us finally notice that, as at most t processes are faulty, pj WB-delivers at most t messages
EST2(−) carrying values different from v and ⊥. Hence, ∀w 6= ⊥ we have #v(rec2j) > t ≥ #w(rec2j), which proves the
lemma.
• Case 2: t < n/4 and the correct processes use the broadcast abstraction NDB.
In that case, due to the NDB broadcast, no two correct processes can NDB-deliver different values from the same faulty process.
The worst case is then when (a) t processes are faulty and NDB-broadcast the same value w /∈ {v,⊥}, and (b) pj NDB-delivers
these t messages EST2(w). We trivially have t ≥ #w(rec2j). On another side, as #v(rec2i) ≥ n − 2t > 2t, and pj misses at
most t messages EST2(v), we have#v(rec2j) > t. Hence, we have#v(rec2j) > t ≥ #w(rec2j), which concludes the proof of
the lemma.
2Lemma 2
Theorem 2. Algorithm 2 solves the multivalued consensus problem (as defined by the C-termination, C-agreement, C-obligation and
C-non-intrusion properties) in both BZ_ASn,t[t < n/5,WB, BBC] and BZ_ASn,t[t < n/4,NDB, BBC].
Proof Proof of the C-termination property (every correct process decides). As at most t processes are faulty, no correct process blocks
forever at line 02 or line 06. Finally, due to the termination property of the underlying binary consensus algorithm BBC, every correct
process decides.
Proof of the C-agreement property (no two correct processes decide differently). If BBC returns 0, all correct processes decide⊥,
and C-agreement trivially follows. Hence, let us consider that BBC returns 1. It then follows from Property 1 of the underlying BBC
that there is a correct process pi such that bpi = 1. Hence, due to Lemma 2, any correct process pj is such that resj = v, and all correct
processes decide v.
Proof of the C-obligation property (if all correct processes propose the same value, that value is decided). Let us assume that all
correct processes propose value v. Let pi be any correct process. We then have #v(rec1i) ≥ n − 2t at each correct process pi, and
consequently each of the (at least) n − t correct process sends EST2(v) (line 05). So, each correct process delivers at least n − 2t of
these messages and we have #v(rec2i) ≥ n − 2t. Hence, any correct pi is such that bpi = 1 and sets resi to v. Due to the obligation
property of the underlying binary consensus, value 1 is decided, and consequently all correct processes decide v.
Proof of the C-non-intrusion property (a non-⊥ value proposed only by faulty processes cannot be decided). If a non-⊥ value is
decided, it follows from Property 1 of the underlying BBC that a correct process pi has proposed 1. Hence, we have bpi = 1, and
consequently #v(rec2i) ≥ n − 2t. As there are at most t faulty processes, it follows that correct processes have broadcast EST2(v),
which in turn implies that n− 2t processes have broadcast EST1(v), i.e., at least n− 3t processes have broadcast EST1(v), from which
we finally conclude that v has been proposed by correct processes. 2Theorem 2
5 A consensus algorithm based on the validated broadcast abstraction
This section presents an intrusion-free Byzantine consensus algorithm based on validated broadcast. This algorithm requires t < n/3
and has consequently an optimal resilience. It requires a single round (instead of 2 as in Figure 2) but, as it uses a validated broadcast,
this round requires four communication steps.
In Algorithm 3, after having VB-broadcast its value, a process pi waits for EST() messages from n − t processes and deposits the
corresponding values in the multiset reci. Then, pi checks if (in addition to ⊥) it has VB-delivered exactly one non-⊥ value v and that
value has been VB-broadcast by at least n − 2t processes (line 04). If there is such a value, pi proposes 1 to the underlying binary
consensus, otherwise it proposes 0 (line 05).
Finally, pi decides ⊥ if the underlying binary consensus returns 0 (lines 08 and 11). Differently, if 1 is returned, pi waits until it has
VB-delivered n−2t EST() carrying the very same value v (line 09) and then decides that value (line 10). Let us notice that, among these
n − 2t messages, some have been already VB-delivered at line 02. The important point is (as shown in the proof) that the net effect of
(a) the validated broadcast, (b) the predicate used at line 04, and (c) the predicate used in the wait statement at line 09, ensures that if a
correct process invokes bin_propose(1), then all correct processes eventually VB-deliver n− 2t times the very same value v and decide
it.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 3 solves the multivalued consensus problem (defined by the C-termination, C-agreement, C-obligation and
C-non-intrusion properties) in BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,VB, BBC].
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operation propose(vi)
(01) VB_broadcast EST1(vi);
(02) wait until
`
EST(−) messages VB_delivered from (n− t) processes´;
(03) let reci = multiset of the values v such that EST(v) is VB_delivered to pi;
(04) if (∃v 6= ⊥ : #v(reci) ≥ n− 2t) ∧ (rec2i contains a single non-⊥ value)
(05) then bpi ← 1 else bpi ← 0
(06) end if;
(07) b_deci ← bin_propose(bpi); % underlying binary consensus %
(08) if (b_deci = 1)
(09) then wait until
`∃v 6= ⊥ such that EST(v) VB_delivered from (n− 2t) processes´;
(10) return(v)
(11) else return(⊥)
(12) end if.
Algorithm 3: A validated-broadcast-based intrusion-tolerant Byzantine consensus algorithm
Proof Proof of the C-termination property (every correct process decides). If the underlying binary consensus returns 0, termination is
trivial. Hence, let us consider that 1 is returned. Due to Property 1, there is a correct process pi such that bpi = 1, which in turn implies
that, at line 02, pi has received at least n − 2t messages EST(v). Due to the VB-no-duplicity and VB-uniformity properties of the VB
abstraction, any correct process eventually VB-delivers these n − 2t messages EST(v). Hence, no correct process pj blocks forever at
line 09, which concludes the proof of the termination property.
Proof of the C-agreement property (no two correct processes decide differently). The proof is similar to the previous one. If the
underlying binary consensus returns 0, agreement is trivial. If 1 is returned, it follows from n − 2t > t, that the value v the processes
are waiting for at line 09 is unique, which completes the proof of the agreement property.
Proof of the C-obligation property (if all correct processes propose the same value, that value is decided). If all correct processes
propose the same value v, it follows from the VB-validation property that v is necessarily validated, and from the other properties that
they all VB-deliver at least n − 2t messages EST(v). Moreover, as n − 2t > t, v is unique. Due to VB-validation property, a value
VB-broadcast only by faulty processes cannot be validated and consequently no correct process can VB-deliver it. This means that only
v, ⊥ or nothing at all can be VB-delivered from a faulty process. It follows that, at each correct process pi, the predicate of line 04 is
satisfied and pi proposes bpi = 1. Due to the C-Obligation property of the binary consensus, they all decide 1 and consequently decide
the same proposed value v.
Proof of the C-non-intrusion property (a non-⊥ value proposed only by faulty processes cannot be decided). If a value w is pro-
posed only by faulty processes, due to the VB-validation property, no correct process pi VB-delivers it. If the binary consensus returns 0,
w is not decided. If binary consensus returns 1, we have seen in the proof of the C-agreement property that the processes decide a value
v such that at least n− 2t messages EST(v) have been VB-delivered, from which we conclude that w cannot be decided. 2Theorem 3
6 Discussion
An interesting property of the previous ITB consensus algorithms Let v be the most proposed value (it is possible that several
values are equally most proposed, in that case any of them is chosen), and let #v be the number of processes that propose it. The
previous algorithms have the following noteworthy property. (This follows from Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Theorem 2 for the instances
obtained from the generic Algorithm 2, and from Theorem 3 for Algorithm 3 based on a validated broadcast.)
• If #v ≥ n− t, then v is always decided by the correct processes (let us observe that, in that case, there is a single most proposed
value).
• If #v < n− 2t, then ⊥ is always decided by the correct processes.
• If n− 2t ≤ #v < n− t, then which value (v or ⊥) is decided by the correct processes depends on the behavior of the Byzantine
processes.
Let us consider an omniscient observer that would know which are the proposed values In the first and the second cases, this
omniscient observer can compute the result in a deterministic way. Differently, in the last case it cannot. The value that is decided
depends actually on the behavior of Byzantine processes (that can favor the most proposed value, or entail a ⊥ decision). These
different possibilities are depicted on Figure 1. Of course, a value proposed only by Byzantine processes is necessarily proposed by less
then n− 2t processes as n > 3t and hence cannot be the decision value.
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n− t ≤ #v ≤ n
deterministic non-deterministic deterministic
⊥ is decided v is decided⊥ or v is decided
1 nn− t
1 ≤ #v < n− 3t
n− 3t ≤ #v < n− t
n− 3t
Figure 1: Deterministic vs non-deterministic scenarios
Comparing the previous signature-free multivalued ITB algorithms Table 2 presents a summary of the cost and the constraint on
t associated with the previous signature-free multivalued ITB consensus algorithms. As they can all use the same underlying BCC
algorithm, the comparison does not take it into account.
It is easy to see that, due the weaker constraint on t, Algorithm 3 instantiated with VB outperforms Algorithm 1 instantiated with
NDB. On another side, in a system where the number of Byzantine processes remains small, Algorithm 1 instantiated with WB is the
most efficient.
Consensus algorithm # communication message size # msgs constraint
instantiated with steps at send/receive level at send/receive level on t
Algorithm 1 withWB 2× 1 = 2 constant O(n2) n > 5t
Algorithm 1 with NDB 2× 2 = 4 log2 n O(n3) n > 4t
Algorithm 3 with VB 1× 6 = 6 log2 n O(n3) n > 3t
Table 2: Cost of the ITB consensus algorithms
7 A randomized VB-based Byzantine binary consensus algorithm
This section presents a randomized Byzantine binary consensus algorithm (that can be used as the underlying BBC algorithm). The
additional power needed to solve consensus is given here by random coins. In addition to being optimal from a resilience point of view
(t < n/3), this algorithm has two noteworthy features:
• It is based on the validated broadcast abstraction, and
• Each round requires 6 communication steps (a single VB-broadcast instance).
When looking at Byzantine consensus algorithms that are optimal from a resilience point of view (i.e., algorithms able to cope with
up to b(n − 1)/3c faulty processes), the best consensus algorithm we are aware of has rounds made up of three communication steps
[7]. Moreover, this algorithm is based on signatures (public key cryptography). As far as signature-free algorithms are concerned, the
best resilience-optimal algorithm, that uses control information whose size is only O(log2 n) we are aware of, is the one described in
[24, 23], which requires five communication steps per round. Algorithm 4 that is presented in this section is signature-free and requires
six communication steps per round. The fifth step in [23] is necessary to ensure errorless termination as explained in the original paper
[24].
7.1 Randomized model
The asynchronous system is equipped with a common coin as defined by Rabin [21] and improved in [7] in order to get rid of the trusted
dealer. Such an oracle is denoted CC, hence the system model is BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,CC ]. A common coin can be seen as a global
entity that delivers a sequence of random bits b1, b2, . . . , br, . . . to processes (each bit br has the value 0 or 1, with probability 1/2).
More precisely, this oracle provides the processes with a primitive denoted random() that returns a bit each time it is called by a
process. In addition to being random, this bit has the following global property: the rth invocation of random() by any correct process
pi returns it the bit br. This means the same random bit br is returned to each correct process as the result of its rth invocation of
random(). It is important to notice that the network has no access to the common coin, which corresponds to the oblivious scheduler
model [2]. (The reader interested in the implementation of a common coin can consult [2, 7].)
On randomized consensus When using additional computing power provided by random coins, the consensus termination property
can no longer be deterministic. The Randomized Consensus problem is defined by C-validity (Obligation), C-agreement plus the
following termination property. [3, 21]:
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• Proba-C-Termination: Every correct process decides with probability 1.
7.2 The algorithm
Underlying principles and description of the algorithm In Algorithm 4, a process pi invokes the function bin_propose(vi) where vi
is the value it proposes. It decides when it executes the statement decide(v) (line 07). The design of Algorithm 4 is close to an algorithm
we have proposed in [13]. Its fundamental difference is that it is resilience-optimal (t < n/3), while the one described in [13] requires
t < n/5.
The local variable esti of process pi keeps its current estimate of the decision value (initially, esti = vi). The processes proceed
by consecutive asynchronous rounds. Thus, the pair (ri, esti) of a correct process pi describes its current state (ri is pi’s current round
number). The first part of Algorithm 4 consists of lines 01-04 that describes the communication of the current round. The second part,
made up of lines 05-10, defines the management of the local estimate esti and the decision rule. More precisely, we have the following.
• At every round ri, each correct process pi VB-broadcasts EST(ri, esti), and waits until it has VB-delivered EST(ri,−) from at
least n− t processes (lines 02-04).
• In the second part, pi first computes the random number s associated with the current round ri (line 05). Then, pi checks if it has
received a non-⊥ value v from at least n − 2t different processes, and v is the only non-⊥ value in reci (predicate at line 06). If
this predicate holds, pi adopts v as new estimate (line 07) and decides the random value s if v = s (line 08). If the predicate is
false, pi updates its estimate esti to the random value s. In all cases, pi starts a new asynchronous round.
The statement decide() allows the invoking process to decide but does not stop its execution. Hence, a process executes rounds
forever. This facilitates the description of the algorithm. Using techniques such as the one developed in [13] allows a process to both
decide and stop.
Remark It is possible to add the following test after line 04:
if (∃v : #v(reci) ≥ n− t) then decide(v) end if
This allows the algorithm to always terminate in a single round whatever the value of the common coin when all correct processes
propose the same value and no process exhibits a Byzantine behavior. This scenario is very likely to happen in actual executions.
operation bin_propose(vi)
esti ← vi; ri ← 0;
repeat forever
(01) ri ← ri + 1;
(02) VB_broadcast EST(ri, esti);
(03) let reci = multiset of values est such that EST(ri, est) has been VB_delivered to pi;
(04) wait until (|reci| ≥ n− t);
(05) si ← random();
(06) if (∃v 6= ⊥ : #v(reci) ≥ n− 2t) ∧ (reci contains a single non-⊥ value)
(07) then esti ← v;
(08) if (v = s) ∧ (pi has not yet decided) then decide(s) end if
(09) else esti ← s
(10) end if
end repeat.
Algorithm 4: A binary Byzantine consensus algorithm based on VB-broadcast
8 Proof
Lemma 3. Let n > 3t. Consider the situation where, at the beginning of a round r, all correct processes pi have the same estimate
value v. The correct processes will never change their estimates, thereafter.
Proof As all correct processes VB-broadcast the same value v at the beginning of round r (line 02), it follows from the VB-validity
property of the VB-broadcast, that v is validated by all correct processes. Hence, the only values that can be VB-delivered by a process
are v and ⊥.
Moreover, by the VB-validity and the VB-termination properties, all correct processes eventually VB-deliver v at least from all
correct processes. Each correct process pi will VB-deliver at least n−2t values v as pi waits for n− tmessages (line 04), among which
at most t are VB-broadcast by Byzantine processes. Let us remark that, due to the VB-validation property, a value w 6= v VB-broadcast
by Byzantine process pj cannot be validated, and consequently ⊥ or no value at all is VB-delivered from pj .
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It follows that the predicate of line 06 is satisfied, and consequently pi sets esti to v (line 07), which concludes the proof of the
lemma. 2Lemma 3
Let COND(v , i) be the predicate that process pi tests at line 06.
Lemma 4. Let n > 3t. If two correct processes pi and pj are such that both COND(v , i) and COND(w , j ) hold at round r, then
v = w.
Proof By the VB-uniformity property of VB-broadcast, no two correct processes VB-deliver different values from the same process.
Hence, if COND(v, i) holds for some process pi, no other correct process pj can VB-deliver a value w 6= v from the same set of
processes. Consequently, if pj VB-delivers a value w 6= v, then the number of occurrences of w is necessarily at most t < n− 2t, and
consequently COND(w , j ) cannot be satisfied. 2Lemma 4
Lemma 5. [C-validity (Obligation)] Let n > 3t. If all correct processes propose the same value v, then no value v′ 6= v can be decided.
Proof This lemma is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3, when we consider r = 1. As all estimates of correct processes remain
equal to v, it follows from line 08 that no value v′ 6= v can be returned by a correct process. 2Lemma 5
Lemma 6. [C-agreement] No two correct processes decide different values.
Proof Let r be the first round during which correct processes decide. If two processes pi and pj decide at line 08 of round r, they
decide the value s computed by the common coin for that round. Moreover, before deciding during round r a process previously updated
its estimate to value s. Hence, all processes that decide during round r have their estimates equal to s. Let us also notice that, if two
processes pi and pj are such that both COND(v , i) and COND(w , j ) hold, by Lemma 4 we have v = w, which means that they decide
the same value.
Let us now consider a correct process pk such that COND(v ′, k) does not hold during round r. It follows from line 08 that pk
updates its estimate to s. Hence, all correct processes start round r + 1 with their estimates equal to s. It then follows from Lemma 4
that they keep always the same value from round r+1. As a decided value is an estimate value, only value v can be decided. 2Lemma 6
Lemma 7. [Proba-C-termination] Each correct process decides with probability 1.
Proof No correct process remains blocked forever during a round r. This follows from the fact that, at every round, a correct process
pi waits for the VB-delivery of a message EST(r,−) from n− t distinct processes, and at every round each correct VB-broadcasts such
a message that (due to the VB-termination property) entails a corresponding VB-delivery at each correct process.
Claim. With probability 1, there is a round r at the end of which all correct processes have the same estimate value. End of the claim.
Assuming the claim holds, it follows from Lemma 3 that all the correct processes pi keep their estimate value esti = v and conse-
quently the predicate COND(v , i) (line 06) is true at every round. Due to common coin CC , it follows that, with probability 1, there is
eventually a round in which the random() outputs v. Then, the condition of line 08 evaluates to true, and all correct processes decide.
Proof of the claim. We need to prove that, with probability 1, there is a round at the end of which all correct processes have the same
estimate value. Let us consider a round r.
• Observe that if all correct processes execute line 09 then, at the end of r, they all adopt the same value (defined by the common
coin) by the end of r. The claim directly follows.
• If all the correct processes execute line 07, due to Lemma 4 they adopt the same value v as their estimate, and the claim follows.
• The third case is when some correct processes execute line 07 and (by Lemma 4) adopt the same value v, while others execute
line 09 and adopt the same value s.
Due to the properties of the common coin, the value it computes at a given round is independent from the values it computes at the
other rounds (and also from the Byzantine behavior and the network scheduler). Thus, s is equal to v with probability p = 1/2.
Let P (r) be the following probability (where varr is the value of var at round r): P (r) = Probability[∃r′ : r′ ≤ r : vr′ = sr′ ].
We have P (r) = p+ (1− p)p+ · · ·+ (1− p)r−1p. So, P (r) = 1− (1− p)r. As limr→+∞ P (r) = 1, the claim follows.
End of the proof of the claim. 2Lemma 7
Theorem 4. Algorithm 4 solves the randomized binary consensus problem in BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,VB,CC ].
Proof Follows from lemmas 5, 6 and 7. 2Theorem 4
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Theorem 5. Let n > 3t. The expected decision time of Algorithm 4 is constant.
Proof As indicated in the proof of Lemma 7, termination is obtained in two phases. First, all correct processes must adopt the same
value v. Second, the outcome of the common coin has be the same as the commonly adopted value v.
Additionally, from the proof of Lemma 7, there is only one situation in which correct processes do not adopt the same value. This
is when the predicate of line 06 is satisfied for a subset of correct processes and not for the other correct processes. Thus, the expected
number of rounds for this to happen is bounded by 2. As for the second phase, here again, the probability that the value output by the
common coin is the same as the value held by all correct processes is 1/2. Thus, the expected time for this to occur is also 2. Combining
the two phases, the expected termination time is 4 rounds (i.e., a small constant). 2Theorem 5
9 Conclusion
The paper has presented a family of multivalued intrusion-free Byzantine consensus algorithms. The intrusion-freedom property means
that no value proposed only by Byzantine processes can ever be decided. These consensus algorithms are built on top of appropriate
broadcast abstractions. One of these abstractions, called validated broadcast, is new (and can be interesting by itself to solve other
problems than consensus). Moreover, all proposed algorithms are signature-free (hence efficient).
The intrusion-free consensus algorithm based on the validated broadcast abstraction has several noteworthy features: it is optimal
from a resilience point of view (t < n/3), each round requires only a single validated broadcast invocation which costs four commu-
nication steps and the size of message control information is O(log2 n). This improves on the best signature-free (non-intrusion-free)
resilience-optimal Byzantine consensus know so far (which requires five communication steps per round [23]).
The paper has also presented a novel randomized binary Byzantine consensus algorithm that is resilient-optimal and, in a very
interesting way, is also based on the validated broadcast abstraction.
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